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The aim of this paper is to offer a critical analy-
sis of the strategic significance of these events. 
Specifically the two areas examined are impact 
on firms doing business in China and second 
the Australia-China relationship. China is a 
relatively new player in capitalist trade and its 
adherence to the market principle is unique and 
contradictory. The Chinese Communist Party is 
the ultimate power and while many commercial 
operations will take place independently, when 
they come to a sticky end, often the Party’s 
firm hand will come to the fore. While acts of 
Australia-China and Stern Hu:















corruption and industrial espionage are at the 
fore of these events, do they simply cloud over 
greater events occurring in the relationship and 
the exchange between the Chinese and Aus-
tralian firms? Can a deal gone wrong like this 
one make the corruption accusation simply a 
front for deeper and more far reaching matters 
of principle in the background?
In July 2009, four Rio Tinto executive 
were arrested by the Chinese government for 
allegations of bribery and stealing state secretes. 
Stern Hu, the head of the Anglo-Australian 
miner’s Shanghai office, and three of his Chi-
nese colleagues, Wang Yong, Ge Minqiang 
and Liu Caikui were sentenced on March 29, 
2010 to ten, fourteen, eight, and seven years DOI: 10.4018/jabim.2011010102
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prison respectively. The four were convicted of 
accepting bribes totaling about $US14 million 
and stealing trade secrets throughout the period 
of iron ore negotiations between the China Iron 
and Steel Association (CISA) and Rio Tinto 
(Mcdonell, 2010).
The four were convicted of accepting bribes 
in return for helping private Chinese mills secure 
access to relatively low-cost and stable term iron 
ore from Rio Tinto. They were also convicted 
of stealing commercial secrets that helped Rio 
in iron ore negotiations with Chinese mills. The 
commercial secrets included information about 
a steel mill’s production cut, a list of licensed iron 
ore importers and proceeds of meetings held by 
the China Iron and Steel Association (Hornby, 
2010). On the 8th of April 8 Stern Hu, decided 
not to appeal his conviction for accepting bribes 
and stealing commercial secrets. Immediately 
after the verdict, Rio Tinto dismissed the four 
executives citing “dishonourable behaviour” 
(Hornby, 2010). This seemingly insensitive 
behavior by Rio Tinto might also be explained 
by the possible repercussions which Rio Tinto 
would face due to Australia’s signature of the 
OECD anti-bribery legislation. Stern Hu’s three 
Chinese colleagues sentenced at the same time 
on the same charges, decided to appeal the 
ruling. A number of China’s most active iron 
ore importers were named as the bribers in the 
court’s verdict, including iron ore trader Sino-
chem International, privately owned Rongcheng 
Steel in Tianjin, also known as Rockcheck Steel, 
and private steel mills Tangshan Guofeng and 
Hebei Jinye (Hornby, 2010).
From the Australian government perspec-
tive and specifically through the voice of the 
Foreign Affairs Minister at the time, Stephen 
Smith, on any measure, the penalty given to 
Stern Hu was considered a “this a tough sen-
tence,” though in the same breath there was 
“substantial” evidence that Hu was guilty of 
bribery (Sainsbury, 2010). Stern Hu and his 
colleagues all admitted taking bribes from small 
and medium private steel mills in exchange for 
providing them with access to regular supplies 
of iron ore at better prices than they could get 
from state-run mills. But they argued during the 
case about the size of the amounts they have 
been accused of receiving.
The arrest of the Rio Tinto executives 
occurred after Rio rejected an offer of $US20 
billion from the state owned Chinalco and the 
collapsed iron ore negotiations (Business Today, 
2010). The charges were supported by the con-
fiscation of inside information and data which 
Stern Hu and others had in their possession on 
Chinese Steel Mills which was interpreted as a 
threat to China’s national security. News of the 
arrest and later the trial of Stern Hu ultimately 
involving Australian companies and executives 
produced media frenzy in Australia. A brisk and 
firm Australian government response took little 
time to arrive. To raise the tension level, Aus-
tralia complained about the trial being closed 
to the public. Australia’s then Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd challenged the Chinese govern-
ment stating ‘The world will be watching how 
this particular court case is conducted’ (Dodd, 
2010). It fed into the resurfacing of ‘jingoistic’ 
fears of China of once upon a time which had 
been expressed some months earlier by the 
opposition finance spokesman Barnaby Joyce 
soon after Chinalco made an offer to takeover 







The case has raised fears of posing a strain 
on the vital economic relationship between 
Australia and China. China’s Foreign Affairs 
ministry was taken aback by the campaign 
emerging in Australia in Stern’s defense and 
warned Australia against ‘politicising’ the trial 
over the court’s decision to hear the charges of 
infringement of commercial secrets in a closed 
courtroom session. With the trial ended the 
spotlight is back on China’s desire to secure 
access to its resources for its surging economy. 
This incident also draws attention to the extent 
that China cannot allow market forces to totally 
International Journal of Asian Business and Information Management, 2(1), 25-31, January-March 2011   27
Copyright © 2011, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global
is prohibited.
determine its commercial relationships. Specifi-
cally Australia, the beneficiary of China’s thirst 
for resources, and the home of the mineral giants 
Rio Tinto and BHP have tried to shift blame and 
focus of this incident away from themselves and 
on to the Chinese political and legal system. 
One need ask if we are replaying Cold War 
tensions, or is it a scenario of the uncertainties 
of doing business in China. Corruption is at the 
centre of the arrests deeply involving Australian 
firms, resources and ultimately the Australian 
relationship. What will be the impact of these 
events on this special relationship?
Doing Business in China
On the whole China has been an enormous 
beneficiary of economic globalisation within 
the global economic system. Since the mid 
1990s, Beijing has promoted China on the 
global stage and welcoming to foreign busi-
nesses. Beijing’s message has been that its 
political values will not dilute the existence of 
a rule-of-law environment within which foreign 
businesses operate. For the most part, especially 
in the low-technology manufacturing and export 
industries, this remained true.
However doing business with China has not 
been an easy task which has been discovered 
by many international MNCs (multinational 
corporations) after heavy financial loses. One 
of the major challenges has been the cultural 
differences and hence the impact of such dif-
ferences on its business practices. The first 
and the very fundamental difference is its eco-
nomic system. China has ‘a market economy 
with socialist characteristics’. This is a unique 
system with a centrally planned fiscal system 
administrated by the central government with 
aspects of a ‘free market economy’. This unique 
structure is difficult to comprehend by firms and 
organisations especially those which come from 
well established market economic structures 
abroad (Chung, 2008).
However, cultural differences are often 
hard to comprehend as they are less tangible 
compared to technical and marketing issues. 
Corporations without culturally-suited strategic 
planning usually end up paying huge costs for 
failures that result (Chung, 2008). To draw a 
medical analogy; all seems well on the outside, 
because culture lies under the skin, but it re-
mains at the heart of everything and can bring 
the whole system down because of a massive 
heart attack (Chung, 2010).
The lack of understanding and transparency 
of the Hu’s case increased fear among executives 
and observers that the risk of doing business in 
a country with a huge market but at the same 
time close ties between the ruling Communist 
Party and the State authorities. Some foreign 
companies at the forefront of advocating closer 
political and economic engagement with China 
in order to get a slice of the pie could soon change 
their minds. It certainly has raised the questions 
among foreign companies whether the arrests 
might indicate that regulatory, protectionist and 
the political environment in China is changing 
and possibly becoming difficult for foreign 
companies to see the advantage of continuing 
to invest in China.
At the same time, the Chinese government 
re-iterated that Hu’s arrest was not politically 
motivated or related. It was their insistence that 
illegal activities, including corruption would 
not be permitted while conducting business in 
China. Moreover the reaction of Chinese busi-
ness community as a whole on this matter and 
the media reaction towards Hu is important. Hu 
is in the category of that of many Chinese who 
went overseas and did well and as such found 
themselves assisting foreign companies. In some 
cases the media used the description of ‘traitor’ 
to describe him and illustrate a dissatisfaction 
of Chinese working for foreign firms. Is there 
any element of the ‘red eye’ syndrome (envy 
and jealousy) one would ask (Chung, 2008).
In short, doing business in China is a chal-
lenge for all international organisations. The 
complication of its political and economical 
system together with the different way of doing 
business in China makes all transactions multi-
dimensional therefore careful assessments of 
situation and capacity to handle these business 
transactions with the Chinese way are crucial 
for doing business in China.
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Rio’s Relationship with Chinese
Cultural differences influence the interpreta-
tions of the goals of the negotiating parties which 
may differ dramatically from their actual goals. 
For instance, when the Chinese make gestures 
to Westerners that they cannot agree to certain 
things because, the outcome may result in the 
Chinese losing face. If the Westerners do not 
understand the significance of this cultural nu-
ance, the negotiation process may be jeopardised 
or experience difficulties. A real example of 
this situation was the negotiation of the iron 
ore prices in 2006 between Rio Tinto and BHP 
and Shanghai Bao Steels and other Chinese steel 
mills. Historically, the international iron and 
steel market has been self regulated in a way 
that once the leading suppliers and purchasers 
negotiated and agreed to an international market 
price, it is to flow on to the rest of the market. 
Up till most recently, Japanese and European 
steel mills have been the larger and/or largest 
steel purchasers. Earlier in 2006 the world’s 
biggest iron ore producer, CVRD a Brazilian 
company won a price increase of 19 percent 
with European steel mills for 2006-2007 con-
tract prices. This flowed on to contracts signed 
with both CVRD and Rio Tinto with Japanese 
steel mills in May 2006 of a 19 percent price 
increase (Wyatt 2006).
China was furious after the announcement 
of the news. Having become the biggest steel 
producer, consumer and iron ore consumer in 
the world, China found itself in a politically 
face losing position that they have failed to 
perform the role of the largest by leading the 
price adjustment. Worse still was China’s loss 
of face to the Japanese. By May 18, 2006, 
China was in a difficult situation. BHP, Rio 
and CVRD went on to negotiate with the rest of 
the world steel mills to secure 57 percent of the 
world market with a 19 percent price increase 
in order to force China into a corner to agree 
to the price increase. By May 29, 2006 China, 
however, was hinting the possibility of opting 
for the spot market price in order to save face 
(Wyatt, 2006). The end result of the negotiation 
was indeed to force China to the negotiation 
table however, straight after the signing in 
June, Chinese media launched a major cham-
pion denouncing Westerners and Australian 
companies as the ‘evil capitalists’ who were 
taking advantage of the Chinese and its rapid 
economic development. This has caused major 
set backs for the relationships between Chinese 
and Australian iron ore producers.
One other cultural character of the Chi-
nese is their long-term memory especially on 
insults and hurt feelings. China is gearing up 
for the forthcoming negotiation of their new 
contracts. There is a Chinese saying ‘A gentle-
man’s revenge is not late even if he has to wait 
for 10 years.’ The Australian negotiators might 
have won their negotiations in 2006, and have 
forgotten about the glory in 2009. Chinese will 
not (Chung, 2009). Will the Australians be 
getting the quantity and the price they need to 
keep the economy at a manageable rate is yet 
to be answered.
If we had the magic to reverse the globe like 
we do in movies, the companies should have 
sought for advice on the cultural understanding 
of ‘the face issue’. The entire negotiation could 
have been handled very differently to avoid the 
negative publicity and still achieve the desired 
results. One Chinese official remarked that 
such actions violated international rules and 
conventions, he said: ‘This will not be helpful 
in building long-term and stable cooperative 
relations between suppliers and buyers’ (Chen, 
2006). The China Iron and Steel Association 
also suggested that ‘negotiating rules’ were 
broken during this year’s price discussions and a 
‘stable long-term co-operative relationship’ was 
clearly not built well enough by the Australian 
producers (Freed, 2006).
What was most humiliating to the Chinese 
was the loss of face rather than the price increase. 
Australian negotiators often puzzled by the fact 
that Chinese negotiators might bargain so hard 
on the price in a negotiation and then sign a 
contract with a different company with a higher 
price. Bargaining of price sometimes may be 
the smoke screen for the Chinese attempting to 
tell the Westerners of other problems, often it 
is an issue of lose face (Chung, 2008).
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Though China joined the WTO in 2001 
and has only over the last three decades encour-
aged inward investment into its own country, 
it has seen fit to not allow this openness to be 
an invitation to act with unnecessary aggres-
siveness by western powers and economies. 
In many respects the Hu incident is merely an 
opportunity for China to remind Rio who is in 
charge of this relationship in their own country 
(Chung, 2009).
However, the unique market situation has 
created opportunities for Hu and his colleagues 
to engage in illegal activities. Rio entered the 
Chinese iron ore market in 2001. From 2003, 
the market changed from a seller’s market to a 
buyer’s market. Rio enjoyed a large portion of 
the Chinese iron and ore market. Previously, 
large steel mills such as Bao Steel and Capital 
Steel would negotiate and purchase iron ore 
from Rio and then on going to sell to smaller 
steel mills at double the price. To some small 
steel mills, they might only gain access to iron 
ore through third-hand transaction (Huaxia.
com, 2010).
Australia’s Relationship with China
Australian relations with China were established 
in late 1972 after decades of Cold War standoff. 
The last decade, primarily through the resources 
boom and the strength of Chinese exports, trade 
relations with China have been strong. They 
were further strengthened with the election of 
a mandarin speaking Prime Minister, Kevin 
Rudd in 2007.
Thought the incident over the Stern Hu 
arrest has brought out bad habits of the past 
in Australia and appears to have continued 
the stalemate of the Free Trade Negotiations 
between China and Australia, (Callick, 2010) 
the two countries have nonetheless reached 
even greater trade achievements in the past 
12 months.
In late 2009 (four months after the arrests), 
it was announced that China had overtaken Ja-
pan to become Australia’s biggest trade partner. 
Trade between the two countries in 2008-09 
reached a staggering $A76.3 billion (DFAT, 
2009). Australia shipped $A22 billion in iron 
ore alone to China in 2008-09, or approximately 
42 per cent of Chinese iron ore imports (DFAT, 
2009). In 2009 China purchased $53 billion of 
iron ore last year – the equivalent of both Japan 
and Korea’s total purchase. This relationship is 
delicate and dependable (Chung 2009).
The then Australian Minister of Trade, Si-
mon Crean, warily highlighted that the trial and 
confessions of the Rio Tinto executives would 
have no impact on Australian trade relations 
with China nor on Australia’s resource trade 
with China or sensitive iron ore sales negotia-
tions (Callick, 2010). The Minister stated: ‘If 
there were links you would have expected the 
trade had fallen, yet last year China became 
our largest trading partner. The two matters are 
separate (Taylor & Regan, 2010).
This line has also been maintained consis-
tently by the Chinese government. A constant 
message that has been sent by the Chinese gov-
ernment to the foreign companies was that they 
are welcome to do business in China. They are 
also welcome to enjoy profits however it must be 
based on legitimate conduct. The judge presid-
ing over Hu’s cased, Justice Liu Xin, said the 
four men had seriously damaged the competitive 
interests of Chinese steel companies. He said 
their actions forced Chinese steel companies 
into an unfavorable position in price negotia-
tions and the this led to the collapse in iron ore 
price negotiations in 2009 (McDonell, 2010).
The irony in all of this is that Kevin Rudd 
at the time was the first Prime Minister to speak 
Chinese which he has flaunted during the lead 
up to his election and after in government. He 
even referred to himself as a Chinese business 
consultant before being elected (Chung, 2009). 
At the same time, the Australia-China political 
relationship is at its historical low since the 
1970s.
Implications for Business
The fact that parts of the trial was behind the 
closed doors and the rejection of Australian 
government representatives’ participation relat-
ing to the commercial secrets allegations makes 
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foreign businesses feeling uneasy. The argument 
of transparency and uncertainty for those doing 
business in China has increased. Australian 
opposition Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Julie 
Bishop expressed that this is an issue of great 
concern to many companies from Australia and 
also from around the world (McDonell, 2010) 
however no government official has ever been 
able to identify exactly what the concern is.
Exactly what is the implication for busi-
ness is a matter of debate between the Chinese 
government and Western businesses. Perhaps 
companies should first carefully examine their 
business conduct in China first before defending 
their positions like the case in Hu’s situation. 
Rio’s executive Sam Walsh defended Hu and 
his colleagues soon after their arrest stating 
‘our employees have acted properly and ethi-
cally’ (Rio Tinto, 2009). Evidence that millions 
of Yuan in bribes had been stuffed into bags 
and boxes for the accused was heard in court 
in March 2010 during the trial (Tang, 2010). 
Hu also took money from small private steel 
companies, which before the global financial 
crisis were locked out of buying iron ore from 
Rio because the mining giant prioritised large 
state-run steel companies (McDonell, 2010).
According to the Chinese media (Xinhua, 
2010) Mr Du, the former head of Shangdong-
based Rizhao Iron and Steel group, claimed he 
paid the Rio employees millions of dollars for 
preferential treatment in the area of iron ore. 
Soon after the guilty verdict declared for Stern 
Hu and his three colleagues, Rio terminated 
their contracts (Rio Tinto, 2010). In Australia, 
under the Criminal Code Amendment (Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials) Act 1999, bribery 
is subject to maximum penalties of imprison-
ment for ten years or a fine of up to $66,000 
or both. Corporations can also be liable where 
their employees, agents or officers commit 
offences while acting within the scope of their 
employment. The penalty for a corporation 
which commits an offence can be as high as 
$330,000 (Chung, 2009). To date, no one has 
asked the question whether Rio had knowledge 
of their ex-employees misconduct and whether 
Rio should be accountable for their actions in this 
incident as well as its China based employees.
The Chinese media has argued that in 
China Hu Stern’s case was non-political. The 
Chinese legal community highly praised the 
Chinese government on being able to keep its 
political and commercial activities separate 
and believed that the legal process was fair 
and proper. According to one source, China’s 
legal practitioners were very pleased how well 
the Chinese government conducted the case 
(Tang, 2010).
CONCLUSION
China’s engagement with the world community 
has been one of the key geo-strategic develop-
ments of the last decade. Moreover China’s 
‘two system’ nature, a development of the mid 
1970s has been the driver of the insertion of 
China as a business player. Many nations and 
the western capitalist system however remain 
uncertain how to relate to this different reality. 
This has without doubt created uncertainties 
in terms of conducting business and relating 
to China. Another consequence has been the 
insistence from China that they will not allow 
their open country for business with lesser 
respect than that accorded to western nations. 
The events surrounding the Hu Stern case has 
allowed China the opportunity to send a mes-
sage of enforcing anti-corruption laws meant 
not be taken lightly by western nations. A new 
protocol for relating to China has been sought 
and with all likelihood this incident which will 
first and foremost affect Australian trade with 
China. It will in our view not be the last.
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